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On July 3, 2001, the Commission of the European Communities
("Commission") rejected the proposed $45 billion merger between The
General Electric Company ("GE") and Honeywell International, Inc.
("Honeywell"), which U.S. antitrust regulators had approved. Of the some
400 mergers involving U.S. companies reviewed by the Commission since
1990, only one had ever been barred. In that instance, however, U.S. au-
thorities had also blocked the proposed transaction.' Thus, the failed GE-
Honeywell merger marked the first time the Commission had blocked a
merger involving U.S. companies that had been approved by U.S. authori-
"JD expected May 2003, Northwestern University School of Law.
'The blocked merger involved WorldCom and Sprint. Blocked Merger Opens E. U.-U.S.
Split (July 4, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/03/eu.merger/
index.html [hereinafter Blocked Merger].
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ties. The Commission's move to block the GE-Honeywell merger brought
a firestorm of criticism.
This paper seeks to explain the different treatment given to the pro-
posed GE-Honeywell merger by European and American regulators, and
explores the reliance by the Commission on an economic theory that has
been rejected by the majority of the U.S. antitrust community. Part II will
give the background of the case and the events leading up to the Commis-
sion's decision. Part III will illuminate the differences in the foci of anti-
trust law between the United States and the European Union, and show that
the European Union is behind the United States in the development of its
antitrust laws. Part IV will analyze the economic rationale behind the
Commission's decision, and posit that the Commission based its decision
on two shaky grounds: a misplaced concern for bundling and foreclosure,
and a dubious economic theory that placed too much weight on speculative
long-term anticompetitive possibilities at the expense of definite short-term
gains for consumers. Part V will explore the potential consequences of di-
vergence in transatlantic antitrust policy, and the opportunity for conver-
gence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Proposed Merger
GE is a behemoth manufacturing and services company based in Fair-
field, Connecticut, with a reported $130 billion in revenues for 2000.2 It is
one of the world's largest manufacturers of jet engines, 3 but offers a wide
array of products and services, including household appliances, network
television (NBC), industrial controls, lighting, power generation, medical
imaging equipment, and engineering plastics. 4 Honeywell, based in Morris-
town, New Jersey, reported $25 billion in sales for 2000. Honeywell is also
a diversified manufacturing and technology company, involved in avionics
products and services, building and industrial controls, automotive prod-
ucts, power generation systems, specialty chemicals, fibers, and home secu-
rity systems, among other things.5 In October 2000, Honeywell, itself
formed by a merger between Honeywell, Inc. and Allied Signal, was in the
process of fleshing out a proposed merger with United Technologies Corp.
2 Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in
Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001) at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/press releases/2001/8140.pdf [hereinafter DOJ PR I].
Jim Vicevich, GE-Honeywell Deal Near Collapse (July 3, 2001), at http://
www.msnbc.com/local/wvit/nbcoob3ipoc.asp.
4 See DOJ PR 1, supra note 2.
51Id.
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when GE presented a more lucrative offer.6
GE and Honeywell hailed this merger of complementary businesses as
a match made in heaven. Jack Welch, the much revered chairman and CEO
of GE, stated, "[n]ot only are the businesses a perfect fit, but so are the peo-
ple and processes." 7 The companies expected the deal to yield significant
cost savings and considerable synergies in the aerospace industry. Welch
delayed his planned April 2001 retirement until the close of the year in or-
der to see the company through this deal. While the parties understood that
the deal, slated to be the largest industrial merger in history,9 would not
likely pass antitrust muster without a few minor changes, no one at the time
predicted the scrutiny that the European Commission would give to the
transaction. Welch predicted that it would be "the cleanest deal you'll ever
see." 0 "Everything is complementary," Welch declared. "That's not a
speech for the antitrust people, that's fact."' 11
B. The European Competition Committee Review Process
Firms that receive annual revenues of 250 million euros (about $218
million) from operations in Europe, and combined global revenues of 5 bil-
lion euros (about $4.35 billion) are automatically subject to a review from
the European Commission. 12 GE and Honeywell easily met these limits.
GE and Honeywell could have merged without the Commission's approval,
but the merged company would have been barred from conducting business
in Europe. 13 Foregoing the right to conduct business in Europe would make
no sense; Europe is one of the world's largest aerospace markets, and GE,
like other American companies, receives a large portion of its revenue out-
side of the United States.
14
An investigation under European Merger Guidelines has a mandated
timetable. After a notification of a proposed merger, the Commission has
6 GE-Honeywell Deal Kaput? (June 15, 2001), at http://money.cnn.com/2001/06/15/
deals/ge honeywell [hereinafter Kaput].
7 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Claudia H. Deutsch, G.E. Buying Honeywell in $45 Billion
Deal, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 23, 2000), at http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/
pop/00I024wodtuesday.html.
8 1d.
9 Mark Baker, U.S./E. U.: Analysis-What Killed The GE-Honeywell Merger?, RADIO
FREE EUROPE (July 10, 2001), at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/07/
10072001124026.asp.
10 Deborah A. Garza, Transatlantic Antitrust: Convergence or Divergence, The Back-
ground, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 6.
1 Id.
12 Michael D. Goldhaber, Deal Breaker, AM. LAWYER, Sept. 2001, at 116.
13 See Baker, supra note 9.; Bill Mann, GE/Honeywell Merger at La Mort's Door?, THE
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one month to make an initial assessment. If the Commission has concerns
about whether the proposed merger violates competition rules, a full inves-
tigation is initiated (Phase II). During these four months, the Commission
will adopt a final decision either to allow the proposed merger to continue
or to reject it."
C. The Investigation
GE and Honeywell notified the Commission on February 5, 2001 of
their proposed deal. On March 2, the Commission announced that Phase II
had been initiated.1 6 The Commission stated that the initial assessment un-
der the Merger Regulation had indicated that the proposed deal might cause
horizontal overlaps,17 most notably in the market for large regional jet en-
gines, that were likely to significantly reduce competition.' 8 The Commis-
sion also found that "vertical effects" (to the extent that Honeywell was a
provider of components to competing jet engine producers) and "conglom-
erate effects" (resulting from the possible bundling ofjet engines with avi-
onics and other airplane parts) were likely to foreclose competition in those
markets.' 9 The focus of the investigation was whether or not the combina-
tion of GE's strong market position on engines and Honeywell's strong
market positions on avionics and certain non-avionics products would result
in, or strengthen a dominant position in any of those markets. 20 The Com-
mission claims that the initiation of Phase II is a "procedural step without
prejudice to the final outcome of the case." 21 Nevertheless, the Commis-
sion's review of the possible range of effects (or conglomerate effects) of
the combined company, which was unexpected by GE, Honeywell, and an-
titrust observers in the United States,22 hinted at trouble ahead.
On May 3, 2001 the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") approved the
proposed merger. The DOJ ruled that because the two companies had
15 Press Release, Europa: The European Union Online, Commission Opens Full Investi-
gation Into the General Electric/Honeywell Merger (March 2, 2001), at http://
www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?paction.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/01/298101AGED
&lg=EN&display= [hereinafter E.U. PR 1].
6 Press Release, Europa: The European Union Online, The Commission Prohibits GE's
Acquisition of Honeywell (July 3, 2001), at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/
guesten.ksh?paction.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/01/939101AGED&lg=EN&display= (last visited
Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter E.U. PR 2].
17 Welch had claimed that there was no product overlap. See Garza, supra note 10, at 6.
18 See E.U. PR 1, supra note 15.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. Only seventeen percent of proposed mergers that trigger Phase I1 are prohibited out-
right. See Goldhaber, supra note 12.
22 John R. Wilke & Matt Murray, U.S. Approves GE's Purchase of Honeywell (May 3,
2001), at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/568046.asp.
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product ranges that were mostly complementary, the companies were not
competitors. 3 The DOJ called for a few relatively minor divestitures, 4 re-
quiring the companies to divest Honeywell's helicopter engine business and
to allow a new third-party provider of maintenance, repair, and overhaul
services for certain Honeywell aircraft engines and auxiliary power units.
According to the DOJ, the merger would have substantially decreased com-
petition in those markets because GE and Honeywell are the two main pro-
ducers of U.S. military helicopter engines, and had received virtually all of
the research and development funding from the Department of Defense for
its Joint Turbine Advanced Gas Generator program. Without the divesti-
tures, the primary consumer (the U.S. Military) would have faced "higher
prices, lower quality and reduced innovation in the design, development,
and production of the next generation of advanced U.S. military helicopter
engines. 26 The Commission, as GE and Honeywell were about to find out,
would demand much more than what the DOJ required.
D. The Commission's Decision
The Commission's Merger Task Force pressed GE to sell more than
half of Honeywell's aerospace division, the division that had led GE to ac-
quire the company in the first place.27 The Commission focused on some of
Honeywell's most prized products, such as ground-proximity warning sys-
tems, collision-avoidance devices, corporate jet engines, and other avion-
ics. 28 These divestitures would equal $6 billion of the $10 billion of yearly
revenue from the aerospace unit, which contributed 40 percent of Honey-
well's $25 billion revenue in 2000.29 After negotiating with the Commis-
sion, GE proposed divestitures that totaled $2.2 billion of Honeywell's
aerospace division.30 The Commission was also concerned that GE's air-
craft leasing subsidiary, GE Capital Aviation Services ("GECAS"), would
require aircraft manufacturers to purchase GE products before it would
23 Baker, supra note 9.
24 Id.
25 See DOJ PR 1, supra note 2.
26 Id.
27 GE-Honeywell Woes Grow (June 12, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/200 1/BUSINESS/
06/12/ge.honeywell/index.html.28 Id,
29 id.
30 Press Release, General Electric, GE and Honeywell Submit Final Undertakings to
European Commission (June 14, 2001), at http://www.ge.com/cgi-bin/cnn-
storydisplaynu.cgi?story=/www/bw/webbox/bw.061401/211652149.htm&strip= 1 &notimes
tamp= 1 &noeditor= 1 &nohrule= 1 &header=%2Fwww%2Fbw%2Fge%2Ftesttop.htm&footer=
%2Fwww%2Fbw%2Fge%2Ftestbot.htm&textcolor=%23000000&bgcolor=%23FFFFFF&li
nkcolor=%230000FF&vlinkcolor-%23551A8B) (last visited Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter GE
PR 1].
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agree to purchase their airplanes. The Commission wanted GE to either
spin-off GECAS, or sell a substantial portion of the unit.3' GE offered to
place a fence around GECAS by creating a separate audit and management
structure (GECAS would still remain wholly owned by GE).32
These proposals, which fell well short of the Commission's demands,
33
would modestly reduce Honeywell's $25 billion in revenues by 9% and the
combined GE-Honeywell revenues by about 1.5%. The projected $3 billion
of synergies resulting from the acquisition would remain largely intact, and
the long-term expectations that the merger would increase GE's earning
growth rate by one to two points would not change. Furthermore, the esti-
mated increase in earnings per share in the first full year of combined op-
erations would only be reduced from eleven cents to nine cents.34 Even so,
these conditions were "extremely painful for GE,"35 and GE and Honeywell
both viewed them as significant concessions.36 Welch stated that GE:
[W]anted to complete the transaction but we have always said there is a point
at which we wouldn't do the deal. The Commission's extraordinary demands
are far beyond that point. This shows you are never too old to get surprised.
In this case, the European regulators' demands exceeded anything I or our
European advisors imagined, and differed sharply from antitrust counterparts
in the United States and Canada.37
This blistering and "very public" 38 statement led many to believe that the
merger was indeed doomed. Honeywell came up with a last minute pro-
posal, offering to accept a lower price if GE would make the required dives-
titures, 39 but Welch rejected it, stating "[w]hat the Commission is seeking
cuts the heart out of the strategic rationale of our deal. The new deal you
propose, in response to the Commission, makes no sense for our shareown-
31 See Kaput, supra note 6.
32 id.
33 See Mann, supra note 13.
34 See GE PR 1, supra note 30.
35 See Mann, supra note 13.
36 Press Release, General Electric, Statement by General Electric Regarding European
Commission Decision (July 3, 2001), at http://www.ge.com/cgi-bin/cnn-
storydisplaynu.cgi?story=/www/bw/webbox/bw.070301/211842232.htm&strip=1 &notimes
tamp= 1 &noeditor I &nohrule=l&header='%2Fwww%2Fbw%2Fge%2Ftesttop.htm&footer=
%2Fwww%2Fbw%2Fge%2Ftestbot.htm&textcolor=%23000000&bgcolor-%23FFFFFF&li
nkcolor='%230000FF&vlinkcolor=-%2355 IA8B (last visited Jan. 29, 2003) [hereinafter GE
PR 21.
37 See GE PR 1, supra note 30.
38 See Kaput, supra note 6.39 E. U. Kills GE-Honeywell (July 3, 2001), at http://europe.cnn.com/200 1/BUSINESS/
07/03/ge.eu/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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ers, for the same strategic reasons."40
4'
On July 3, the Commission officially blocked the proposed merger.
It concluded that the merger would create or strengthen dominant market
positions in several markets and that the proposals made by GE were inade-
quate to resolve those competition concerns. European Competition Com-
missioner Mario Monti announced that the merger would have "severely
reduced competition in the aerospace industry and resulted ultimately in
higher prices for customers, particularly airlines. 42 He further pronounced
his regret that a negotiated solution was not reached, and acknowledged the
different decision reached by the U.S. antitrust authorities.43 The focus was
on the horizontal overlaps and vertical integration of the two companies that
would allow GE-Honeywell to bundle44 GE jet engines with Honeywell
avionics and GECAS financing.45 The main concern was not leveraging but
that, with the bundling, GE could then sell to buyers such as Boeing or Air-
bus at cheaper prices than what competitors such as Great Britain's Rolls
Royce PLC and France's Thales SA could offer.4 6 The Commission stated
that this would foreclose competitors, thereby eliminating competition,
which would ultimately have adverse effects on product quality, services,
and prices.47
GE quickly responded with a press release stating its deep disappoint-
ment. GE claimed that the Commission's assertions of harmful effects on
competition were not supported by the facts, and that the Commission took
a "fundamentally different approach to competitive issues than its counter-
parts in the United States, Canada and nearly a dozen other jurisdictions,"
further noting that these jurisdictions had approved the merger "with few, if
40 Press Release, General Electric, General Electric Releases Letter From Chairman and
CEO Jack Welch (June 29, 2001), at http://www.ge.com/cgi-bin/cnn-
storydisplaynu.cgi?story=/www/bw/webbox/bw.062901/211802274.htm&strip=1 &notimes
tamp= 1 &noeditor = 1 &nohrule=1 &header=%2Fwww%2Fbw%2Fge%2Ftesttop.htm&footer=
%2Fwww%2Fbw%2Fge%2Ftestbot.htm&textcolor=%23000000&bgcolor=%23FFFFFF&li
nkcolor=%230000FF&vlinkcolor=%2355 1A8B (last visited Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter GE
PR 3].
41 See E.U. PR 2, supra note 16.
42 id.
43 id.
44 Europe Business News, E. U. Rejection of GE-Honeywell Merger Adds New Strain
With U.S. (July 5, 2001), at http://www.europebusinessnews.com/Market/
Market.cfm?ID=498&c=3.
45 Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible
With the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, Case No. COMP/M.2220-General
Electric/Honeywell, at 229, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
mergers/cases/decisions/m2220 en.pdf [hereinafter CD GE].
4bJohn Christoffersen & Paul Geitner, GE's Welch Risked Big in Merger Effort, THE
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Online Edition) (July 8, 2001), at http://enquirer.com/editions/
2001/07/08/fin geswelchriskedbig.html.
4" CD GE, supra note 45, at 1355.; see also E.U. PR 2, supra note 16.
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any conditions., 48 The Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James of the
DOJ agreed with GE that the merger "would have been procompetitive and
beneficial to customers., 49 The DOJ concluded that the combined firm
could offer better products and services at better prices than what either
company could offer on its own. "That, in our view, is the essence of com-
petition., 50 The Commission's decision, James noted, "reflects a significant
point of divergence." 51
III. DIFFERENT ANTITRUST AIMS
Why was there such a difference in outcomes? The answer to that
question requires a look into the broader goals of antitrust law (or competi-
tion law, as it is called in Europe). Antitrust analysis today is largely an
economic endeavor-in the United States especially, what matters is prices
and quantities. 52 As Assistant Attorney General James stated, "[c]lear and
longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the antitrust laws protect com-
petition, not competitors.,
53
A. The Structure-Conduct-Performance Theory vs. The Chicago School
The goal of U.S. antitrust policy was not always so clear. Until rela-
tively recently, 54 antitrust economics was heavily influenced by the "struc-
ture-conduct-performance paradigm ' 55 manifested by industrial
organization economists of the "Harvard" school.56 This theory posited that
the structure of the market determined whether competition was feasible.
Within industries that were highly concentrated (the top four firms having
around fifty percent of sales was a good benchmark), competition would be
feeble unless there was government intervention to break up the concen-
trated industries. Proponents of this paradigm supported this theory with
data showing that the most concentrated industries were the most profit-
48 See GE PR 2, supra note 36.
49 Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles
A. James on the E.U.'s Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition (July 3, 2001), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/8510.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003
[hereinafter DOJ PR 2].
5 0 d.
51Id
52 See Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also Nat'l Soc'y of
Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
53 See DOJ PR 2, supra note 49.
54 Paul L. Joskow, The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Util-
ity Regulatory Policies, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 55 (1991).
55 Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986).
56 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979).
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able."
Structure-conduct-performance had an affect on antitrust policy that
was characterized by a suspicion of many industrial practices. 58 Monopoli-
zation seemed just around the comer for any firm, and any behavior that
could lead to concentration and monopolization warranted hostility. Such
behavior included tie-ins (or bundling), vertical integration, resale price
maintenance, and predatory pricing.59
Skeptics arose who doubted the perfect competition model upon which
the structure-conduct-performance theory was based.60 The skeptics
charged that industrial organization of the 1950's and early 1960's:
[T]ended to be untheoretical, descriptive, "institutional," and even metaphori-
cal. Casual observation of business behavior, colorful characterizations (such
as the term "barrier to entry"), eclectic forays into sociology and psychology,
descriptive statistics, and verification by plausibility took the place of the care-
ful definitions and parsimonious logical structure of economic theory. The re-
sult was that industrial organization regularly advanced propositions that
contradicted economic theory.6'
This school of criticism came to be known as the "Chicago School. 6 2
The Chicago School argued that resale price maintenance is a way of fight-
ing the free-rider problem, and that predatory pricing in almost all cases is
unprofitable.63 A firm that prices below cost will lose money in the short
term, and an attempt to raise profits later to recoup the losses will result in
the entrance of new competitors.64 The Chicago School also argued that
vertical integration could be pro-competitive. 65 Vertical integration in-
volves complementary products, and an upstream monopolist gains nothing
from monopolizing downstream.66 In addition, the theory that vertical inte-
gration creates barriers to entry for competitors (by making entry in the
market more costly due to the fact that new competitors also need to be ver-
tically integrated) is negated by the point that "the cost to the monopolist of
57 See Easterbrook, supra note 55.
s id.
59 Posner, supra note 56, at 926-27. For an example of a decision that shows hostility
towards a business practice, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953). The fact that the business practices of the defendant were "long-standing
traditions" in the industry and followed by competitors was no bar to liability. Id. at 344.
60 See Easterbrook, supra note 55, at 1696. For a good list and discussion of the funda-
mental points of skepticism, see id. at 1700-01.
61 Posner, supra note 56, at 928-29.
62 Id. at n.1-2, at 925; Joskow, supra note 54, at 56; see also Easterbrook, supra note 55.
63 Posner, supra note 56, at 927.
64 id.
65 CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW 465 (1998) [citing Telser,
What Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960)].66 See Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, app. A, B (lst Cir. 1990).
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integrating is prima facie the same as the cost to the new entrant of having
to integrate. 67 There is no advantage for the integrator from a monopoly
perspective. There had to be a different explanation as to why firms par-
ticipated in these practices other than the old suspicion that they were after
monopoly profits. The hypothesis under the Chicago School is that the mo-
tivation must be a desire for efficiency rather that for monopoly.
68
The Chicago School addressed tying by arguing that a tie-in is not an
economically rational way of obtaining monopoly profits in a second prod-
uct, because a higher price for the tied product will reduce the price that a
consumer is willing to pay for the tying product.69 A related notion, the lev-
erage theory, hypothesized that a monopolist of one product could and
would monopolize the product's complements as well in order to receive
more monopoly profits. 70 For example, a monopolist of aircraft engines
would require aircraft builders to buy its avionics in order for the builders to
obtain the monopolist's engines (what good would it be to buy avionics
from other producers if plane makers could not obtain engines?). But this
also makes no economic sense for the monopolist. The Chicago School
conjectured that the pricing of individual components is but a detail to the
buyer. The buyer is concerned with the total price of the products. Given
that the first product is already priced at the optimal monopoly level, if the
producer charges the higher monopoly price for the complementary prod-
uct, the total price of the products will be raised above the optimal monop-
oly price, thereby reducing the monopolist's profits.
71
The Chicago School does not do away with the possibility of illegal ty-
ing. It would be easy to construct situations in which a monopolist in one
product could leverage that power to increase sales in another product. But
the Chicago School poses a valid question as to whether tying is always il-
legal. The forcing of consumers to buy a product they would not otherwise
purchase must exist for there to be illegality. The character of the demand
for both the tying and tied product is the correct lens through which tying
should be analyzed. This approach is referenced in Jefferson Parish Hosp.
v. Hyde. 2 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor states that there
could be possible economic benefits of tie-ins.7 3
Today in the United States, the structure-conduct-performance para-
digm has gone by the wayside, and few, if any, economists adhere to it.
74
67 Posner, supra note 56, at 936.
68 Id. at 927.691 d. at 926.
7 d. at 929.
71 id.
72 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
73 Id. at 35.
74 Easterbrook, supra note 55, at 1698.
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Under the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, the answer to the ques-
tion of whether competitive injury can be found was "almost always," while
the answer under the Chicago School is "almost never., 75 A more moder-
ate, eclectic post-Chicago way of thinking has emerged, where the answer
to the question of whether competitive harm can be found is "maybe."
Therefore, the basic point of the Chicago School has prevailed; the proper
lens for analyzing antitrust problems is price theory. 76 The notion that
problems of competition and monopoly should be analyzed using the tools
of general economic theory rather than those of traditional industrial or-
ganization has triumphed.77 Current Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence
emphasizes efficiency and consumer welfare,78 and U.S. merger policy is
much more tolerant of concentration now.79 This holds especially true in
the vertical merger context, where the possibility of efficiencies is overtly
declared. 80 The debate still ensues as to the absolute viability of the Chi-
cago School, but it exposed the lack of a "meaningful relationship between
sensible notions of competition in relevant horizontal markets ' 8' and the
theories that characterized the analysis of unilateral conduct under the struc-
ture-conduct-performance paradigm.
82
B. The Focus of Antitrust Laws
There are three general dangers of mergers. Mergers offer an oppor-
tune way to create a monopoly as firms buy out competitors and gain the
ability to raise prices. 83 Mergers also facilitate coordination amongst com-
petitors that can harm consumers.84 Finally, mergers can be problematic by
lessening competition, thereby reducing incentives to be efficient and inno-
vative. 85 The effects of the Chicago School's supposition that firms are ra-
75 Spencer Weber Waller & Robert Stoner, Economists Abroad, 15-SPG ANTITRUST 66
(2001) (book review).
76 Posner, supra note 56, at 932.
77 Id. at 933-34.
78 For an extensive list of cases, see Easterbrook, supra note 55, at n.7.
79
1d. at 1698.
80 See U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines § 4, (Revised 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/horizbook/toc.html (last visited March 1, 2002) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines];
see also Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Steven C. Sunshine, Address at The American
Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting (May 11, 1995), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2215.htm.
81 Joskow, supra note 54, at 56.
82 Id.
83 Eric J. Stock, Explaining the Differing U.S. and E. U. Positions on the Boe-
ing/McDonnell-Douglas Merger: Avoiding Another Near-Miss, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
825, 830 (1999).
84 id.
85 See Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a
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tionally unable to obtain or improve monopoly power through unilateral ac-
tion 86 is apparent in current U.S. merger policy. Although the potential
dangers of unilateral conduct are recognized,87 the first potential danger of
mergers, namely monopoly creation, is not as heavily scrutinized as cartel
facilitation and market-wide lassitude. U.S. merger review focuses more on
collusion and coordination between competitors.
88
This is not the case in Europe. The Commission there is concerned
more with monopoly creation and the complacency of a market-dominating
firm. 89 For European regulators, the most crucial test in assessing mergers
is whether the merger creates or strengthens a dominant position.90 This is
expressly stated in the E.C. Merger Regulation, under which mergers are
examined.91 In the United States, the principal standard of whether a prac-
tice is anticompetitive is whether the practice benefits or harms consum-
ers.92 In Europe, however, the stated goal is to protect consumers by
maintaining a high degree of competition in the common market.93 The
most important factor for the Commission in analyzing inter-firm coopera-
tion is market structure and the position of the cooperating firms within that
market.94 This notion of maintaining competition by avoiding concentra-
tion was "fashionable in the United States in antitrust circles 50 years ago
or so." 95 It seems that Europe has yet to advance from the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm. Critics accuse the Commission of focusing
on the number of competitors in the market instead of the effect of competi-
tion upon consumers. This one-or-the-other approach is perhaps too harsh;
the idea of protecting consumers versus protecting competitors is more a
continuum than a dichotomy.96 This is evidenced in the European Union by
the tension between the competition laws and member states' rules on un-
Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195 (1992).
86 See Posner, supra note 56, at 928.
87 Merger Guidelines, supra note 80, at § 0.1.
88 Stock, supra note 83, at 831-32.89 ld. at 831.
90 E.U. PR 2, supra note 16.
91 Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
92 Baker, supra note 9.
93 Mario Monti, The Future for Competition Policy in the European Union, Address at
Merchant Taylor's Hall (July 9, 2001), at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/
guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt--gt&doc=SPEECH/01/340101RAPID&lg=EN [hereinafter Monti
Speech].94 Andre Fiebig, European Law on Competition is Modernizing, Results are Important
for U.S. Practitioners, 8/6/2001 N.Y.L.J. 7, (col. 1).
95 Baker, supra note 9 (quoting George Priest, Professor of Law and Economics at Yale
University Law School).
96 This is similar to the modes of analysis in U.S. antitrust law concerning the per se rule
versus the rule of reason. For more on this, see ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 168 (4th ed. 1994).
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fair competition, which more explicitly focus on protecting competitors.
97
Accordingly, the Commission denies that European merger control is about
protecting competitors instead of consumers. 98 Nevertheless, E.U. competi-
tion policy is closer to the "protecting competitors" end of the continuum
than U.S. antitrust policy is, thus critics see a "longing for a world in which
artisans make leather artifacts in tiny shops. 99
The anti-efficiency stance, in which possible efficiencies either play no
role in merger analysis or could be the reason for barring a merger, was
once the state of U.S. antitrust law. This was embodied in Federal Trade
Commission v. Procter & Gamble.100 In this case, Procter & Gamble
("Procter"), a large and diversified manufacturer of household products, ac-
quired Clorox Chemical Co. ("Clorox"), the leading manufacturer of
household liquid bleach, through a merger. 0 1 The Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("FTC") brought suit, claiming that the merger was in violation of sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court noted that both companies
were in highly concentrated industries. Procter accounted for 54.4% of its
market, and with its two nearest competitors, accounted for 80% of the
market.102 Clorox and its five nearest competitors accounted for almost
80% of their market. 1
03
The Court found that this merger would be anticompetitive in two
ways: "[t]he substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller, but
already dominant, firm may substantially reduce the competitive structure
of the industry by raising entry barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms
from aggressively competing [and] ... the acquisition eliminates the poten-
tial competition of the acquiring firm.' 0 4 The concern here was that the
market would grow even more concentrated, and competitors would die
away. The assets and advertising advantages of Procter would create entry
barriers, the Court reasoned. 0 5 The Court of Appeals had determined oth-
erwise. It found that the existence of over 200 smaller producers of bleach
indicated that there did not seem to be anything unhealthy about the mar-
ket.10 6 It noted that there was no evidence that Procter could leverage its as-
sets into any gain that Clorox did not already have, or that Procter had
planned on entering the bleach market on its own. Illegality, it further
97 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES,
EUROPEAN UNION 14 (2001).
98 E.U. PR 2, supra note 16.
99 Easterbrook, supra note 55, at 1697.
'00 386 U.S. 568 (1967) [hereinafter FTC v. P&G].
101 Id. at 571, (indicating that Clorox had 48.8% of national sales).
102 Id. at 573.
'03 Id. at 571.
4 Id. at 578.
105 FTC v. P&G, supra note 100, at 575.
106 Id. at 576.
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noted, could not be found on the basis of advertising advantages. 
107
But the Supreme Court rejected these conclusions by stating that the
core question concerned incipiency.108 Illegality, the Court held, is based
on whether the merger could have anticompetitive effects, regardless of any
efficiencies that may arise. The Court stated that "[p]ossible economies
cannot be used as a defense to illegality."'0 9 In this case, the Court held ef-
ficiencies against Procter, saying that the merger would allow Procter to be
a superior competitor. The Court cited Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
which suggested that Congress was concerned with market concentration
rather than consumers.' 10
The Court's decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gam-
ble no longer accurately portrays the state of U.S. antitrust law. A com-
pany's efficiencies may "hurt" other competitors, but efficiencies benefit
consumers. Timothy Muris, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
stated "[t]he focus is clearly on consumers, and that debate is over." '111 The
1997 amendments to the Merger Guidelines recognize efficiencies as rele-
vant in determining whether a merger is anticompetitive. 12 The European
Union seems to still be in the realm of Federal Trade Commission v. Proc-
ter & Gamble. Like the Court in that case, the Commission essentially pun-
ished GE for its size and financial assets, which GE could use to beat out
competitors in Honeywell's lines of business.113 This is a focus on competi-
tors, not competition. While the differing foci may seem like splitting hairs,
it is "clear in practice and is recognized by enforcement officials." 1 14 The
emphasis in the European Union is on competitors and competitive lever-
age,115 while the emphasis in the United States on the effect of a merger is
future prices. 16 In terms of preventing harm from mergers, E.U. competi-
tion law centers more on single firm dominance "while U.S. antitrust law
107 Id.
'0 Id. at 577.
'0' Id. at 580.
110 FTC v. P&G, supra note 100, at 580 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, at 344 (1962)).
111 Interview with Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the FTC, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 52.
112 See Merger Guidelines, supra note 80, at § 4.
113 Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell:
Causes and Lessons, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 18, 19.
114 Stock, supra note 83, at 833.
l15 "[G]iven the increased incentives to leverage market power in Europe ... Our legal
mandate is to stop the emergence of' unfavorable "market structures", Deborah A. Garza,
Roundtable Discussion, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 9 (Francisco-Enrique Gonzalez-Diaz,
Head of Unit of the Merger Task Force, DG Comp, European Commission, and lead attor-
ney on GE-Honeywell) [hereinafter Roundtable].
116 Robert Pitofsky, Address Before the Business Development Associates, Staples and
Boeing: What They Say About Merger Enforcement at the FTC (Sept. 23, 1997), at http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/STAPLESspc.htm.
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concentrates on the market more generally." ' 17 The notion of "restraint of
competition" is given an "extremely broad interpretation" by the Commis-
sion and European Courts. 1 8 E.U. competition law is less influenced by the
Chicago School, which posits that a monopoly tends to be self-correcting
(due to the monopolist's profits attracting new entrants) and that barriers to
entry are not prominent in the long term. 119
A significant difference in Europe is that the aims of its competition
policy are economic, political, and social.12 0 Of course, this can also be said
of the Sherman Act. 21 But while the debate continues in the United States
concerning what the aims of antitrust policy should be, there is no such de-
bate in Europe. The E.U. competition policy is subservient to the E.C.'s
Treaty of Rome. 122 Mario Monti, the E.U. Competition Commissioner,
states that "[c]ompetition policy is also strictly connected with another of
the fundamental objectives of the E.C. Treaty, namely the creation of the
Single Market."' 123 Commissioner Monti's predecessor, Karel Van Miert,
stated that this necessitates "the need to safeguard a pluralistic democracy,
which could not survive a strong concentration of economic power.',' 24 A
resulting implication is that E.U. law may protect competitors at the ex-
pense of consumers. Occasionally, pure economic competition concerns
take a back seat to the overriding integration imperative fueling all of E.U.
law. 125 The European Union is not as free-market oriented as the United
States.126 Commissioner Monti has extolled the E.C. Treaty as acknowledg-
ing the fundamental role of the market and competition to promote con-
sumer welfare, optimal allocation of resources, and incentives for efficiency
and innovation. 27 However, at the same time, he has iterated his personal
belief that this fundamental principle of an open market economy "does not
117 Stock, supra note 83, at 834.
18 See Fiebig, supra note 94.
119 See Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals, and Dominant Undertakings:
The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L.J.
443, 456, 458 (1996).
120 Stock, supra note 83, at 835-36.
121 See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 96, at 20-22.
122 Waller & Stoner, supra note 75, at 67.
123 Mario Monti, European Competition for the 2 1St Century, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1602, 1604 (2001).
124 Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 119, at 450.
125 Waller & Stoner, supra note 75, at 67; Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, ... In With
the New, 8/21/2001 N.Y.L.J. 3, (col. 1) (U.S. regulators are not immune from using antitrust
laws for "social engineering." But while the U.S. regulators are merely susceptible, E.U.
regulators are anything but shy about "holding transactions hostage to address conduct ancil-
lary to the matter under review").
126 GE Pessimistic on Merger (June 14, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/BUSINESS/
06/14/ge/index.html (quoting A.G. Edwards analyst Kent Newcomb).
127 Monti, supra note 123, at 1603.
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imply an attitude of unconditional faith with respect to the operation of
market mechanisms. It requires a serious commitment.., by public pow-
ers." 128 In other words, strong intervention is necessary to maintain an open
economy (not quite the full "invisible hand" view of capitalism). 1
29
IV. ECONOMIC, PROCEDURAL, AND POLITICAL CRITICISMS
A. Economic Analysis
The European Union's goal of a common market in no way implies
that the Commission does not partake in sophisticated economic analysis.
The European Union has "moved to a more American, economics-based
approach."130 Although the Chicago School may sometimes scoff at the
proposition, it is apparent that protecting competitors can be a means of
protecting competition,' 3' and accusations that the Commission concen-
trated on protecting competitors does not mean that it eschewed economic
analysis. However, a problem arises when the focus on market structure
dissipates obvious benefits to consumers. Because suspect economic theo-
ries can have the effect of ignoring benefits to consumers, U.S. antitrust ob-
servers have issues with the kind of economic analysis that is sometimes
applied by the Commission. The GE-Honeywell merger decision was
based on such an analysis, an economic theory that U.S. practitioners view
as dubious. 132 This theory, called the "range effects" or "portfolio power"
theory, is not accepted in the U.S. antitrust community. 33 In fact, it is anti-
thetical to U.S. antitrust policy.
34
In essence, the range effects theory posits that a combination of com-
plementary products would give the firm an opportunity to bundle products
at lower prices than if the products were sold separately. 35 This use of a
company's "range" or "portfolio" of products would hurt competition in the
long run because of the possibility that weaker competitors would be mar-
128 id.
129 Intervention can also be a staple in the United States, but the E.U. intervention does
not have the same goals and is not under the same policies as the United States, which are
more free-market oriented and less pluralistic.
130 James Graff, Exclusive Interview: How the G.E.-Honeywell Merger Was Killed, TIME
EUROPE (Nov. 20, 2001), at http://www.time.com/time/europe/biz/interview/
0,9868,166778,00.html (quote by Mario Monti).
13 1 And, of course, the more concentrated the market, the more this can be true. This was
not lost in GE-Honeywell. Roundtable, supra note 115, at 10.
32 Fiebig, supra note 94.
33 id.
134 William J. Kolasky & Leon B. Greenfield, A View to Kill: The Lost GE/Honeywell
Deal Reveals a Trans-Atlantic Clash of Essentials, LEGAL TIMES, July 30, 2001, at 28.
135 Charles River Associates, The Proposed GE/Honeywell Acquisition, CRA INSIGHTS,
Fall 2001, at 5 [hereinafter CRA].
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ginalized or pushed out of the market. 13 6 The range effects theory is hostile
to a merger for the exact reason that modem U.S. policy would favor it-
the merger "will generate lower prices for consumers and require competi-
tors to work harder to keep up.'
137
Is there a better definition of competition than this? Remarkably, the
range effects theory penalizes a firm for doing what it is supposed to do-
namely, competing. Since when is it a firm's responsibility to make life
easier for its rivals? Imagine a hypothetical merger between complemen-
tary firms-a video game console maker and a software company-and its
potential efficiencies. The merger could bring about: (a) product integra-
tion, such as compatible processors and chipsets; (b) economies of scale
and scope, by allowing production under one roof and a more efficient
dedication of research and development; (c) distribution efficiencies, by
showcasing and delivering products at the same time; (d) one-stop shop-
ping, saving wholesalers and retailers transaction costs; and (e) discounting,
by giving suppliers an incentive to offer discounts on one product for buy-
ers of the other product. 138 Consumers would get better products at cheaper
prices due to both the efficiencies of the merged firm and the innovation
necessary for other firms to compete. Those firms who fail to innovate
would lose market share. That is the essence of competition.'39
Bundling could result in anticompetitiv6 effects if, for instance, the
console maker with a monopoly required consumers to purchase the poor
quality games of the software company. However, this would only be an
issue if the consumer has no competing product from which to choose. The
Commission disregarded the potential benefits of the GE-Honeywell
merger even though forced buying was not the case. The concern, inter
alia, was that GE-Honeywell would engage in "mixed bundling" in existing
markets, meaning that individual components would still be sold separately,
just not as cheaply as a bundle.140 Absent unreasonable prices for the prod-
ucts sold individually (which would virtually exclude the separate product
as a viable choice), no reasonable claim can be made that mixed bundling is
not competition on the merits.
The Commission was concerned that GE-Honeywell, due to efficien-
cies and economies of scale, could offer a combination of jet engines and
avionics at lower prices.'14 The speculation was that those firms who offer
136 Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 134.
137 id.
138 See id. Kolasky and Greenfield offer a very good example of a merger between tele-
vision and DVD producers.139 id.
140 Jay Pil Choi, A Theory of Mixed Bundling Applied to the GE/Honeywell Merger,
ANrrRUST, Fall 2001, at 32.
141 CD GE, supra note 45, 391.
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only engines or only avionics would be at a disadvantage, and thus lose
market share. 42 In the long run, then, GE-Honeywell would yield enough
market power to raise prices and receive monopoly profits. The Commis-
sion's analysis is imperfect, stating that even if the policy concerns were set
aside, the range effects theory only works "in those rare circumstances
where the likelihood of long-run harm outweighs any short-run benefits.
'1 43
In the past, both the United States and the European Commission have fo-
cused on probable short- or medium-term effects stemming from a merger,
rather than any distant speculative possibilities.144 Unfortunately, the GE-
Honeywell decision shows the European Commission's willingness to
block a merger based on low and speculative probability of long-term con-
sumer harm, 145 which U.S. antitrust authorities would be unlikely to do.
For the portfolio power theory to be valid, certain circumstances must
be evident. First, short-run benefits to the merged entity must be substantial
and produce significant advantages for the firm (and significant disadvan-
tages for competitors). Second, rivals must do nothing to respond to the
challenge, to innovate by offering better products, or to lower costs. Third,
competitive harm must be large, likely, and soon (or else the present value
of the short-run benefits will outweigh the present value of the future
harm). 46 An analysis of the conditions in the GE-Honeywell merger shows
that these conditions are not evident.
First, the benefits of bundling are far from certain. The European
Commission stated that bundling would allow GE-Honeywell to induce
customers to purchase GE-Honeywell products. 47 This would increase
their market share, and cause "damaging profit shrinkage" for competi-
tors. 148 But if bundling products is so beneficial to companies, why is it not
widespread? The Commission cited only scant evidence of instances in
which bundling had occurred.149 The bundling theory does a very poor job
of "predicting the past."'150 The Commission noted that competing bundles
would not be as cheap as packages offered by GE-Honeywell, 151 but cer-
tainly bundled products are cheaper than stand alone products. Yet there is
no evidence that bundling has allowed a firm to gain significant market
142 See Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 134.
143 CRA, supra note 135, at 5.
44 Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 134.
145 Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 125.
146 CRA, supra note 135, at 5.
47 CD GE, supra note 45, T 360.
148 Id. 355.
"49 Id. 362-73.
Iso CRA, supra note 135, at 6.
'51 CD GE, supra note 45, 378.
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shares. 152 In an earlier merger between Allied Signal and Honeywell, the
Commission found that "although packages of non-avionics and avionics
have existed, they are nevertheless rare."'153 For instance, Honeywell,
whom the Commission found to possess monopoly position in some prod-
ucts, 154 has not been more successful in selling its components on aircraft
for which it offers engines than for aircraft in which it does not.155 Snecma,
a French company, offers another example. Snecma owns 50% of CFMI, a
joint venture with GE that has accounted for a high percentage of large
commercial aircraft engine sales.1 56 Snecma, like GE-Honeywell would,
sells aircraft parts other than engines. But there was no evidence that
Snecma was bundling products, nor was there evidence that Snecma used
its 50% share of CFMI to gain dominance in any related component indus-
try or that Snecma's competitors were being damaged or forced out of the
market. 157
Due to the fact that bundling is lawful competition, those evidentiary
points need not be discussed. Bundling, especially mixed bundling, is not
an illegal activity, it is just another way of offering a service to customers.
If it is a better way to offer products, then consumers will opt for it, while if
it is not, consumers will opt for individual products of the seller or another
suppliers. The Commission essentially punished GE-Honeywell for being a
potential' 58 effective competitor, much like the Court in FTC v. Procter &
Gamble.'59 Incredibly, conclusions such as "[c]ustomers ... appear to have
a strong preference for GE's products and services" 160 and "the merged en-
tity is likely to attract more customers that its competitors,"' 16 1 without any
allegations of illegal anticompetitive behavior, were used to fault GE and
Honeywell throughout the Commission's decision.
Second, the Commission's assumption that rivals would respond by
exiting the market is not economically rational. The point of competition is
to force firms to respond to their competitors' lower costs or better quality
with innovations of their own.1 62 The Commission decided that as GE-
152 See CRA, supra note 135, at 6.
153 Commission Decision of 1 December 1999 Declaring a Concentration Compatible
with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, 1999 O.J. (L 152) 1,
17.
154 CD GE, supra note 45, 358.
155 CRA, supra note 135, at 6.
156 id.
157 Id.
158 It makes sense for antitrust regulators to resolve potential anticompetitive behavior
with conduct remedies, such as consent decrees not to engage in bundling. Conduct reme-
dies, however, are not available to the Commission. See text, infra Part IV.B.
159 See text supra, Part III.B.
160 CD GE, supra note 45, at 225.
161 Id. at 378.
162 Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 134.
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Honeywell's rivals were foreclosed, it would have less capital to spend on
research and development, thus stunting its ability to innovate and leap-
frog.' 63 But that argument also works the other way around-the better a
firm does in the market, the more funds it can use for future innovation,
which in turn allows it to compete more effectively. Research and devel-
opment funds are a part of competition, not separate from it. This cycle of
incentives is what drives competition. Range effects theory inverts this cy-
cle on incentives. It bars efficiency-creating deals that would spur competi-
tive behavior. This is a downward spiral in which competitors have more
incentives to rely on regulators than to innovate their products and ser-
vices. 164 It denies consumers the benefits of almost certain lower prices and
better quality and justifies the denial with speculative long-term concerns
that competition would force some firms to leave the market. Range effects
theory opens the possibility that a firm's efficiencies may be anticompeti-
tive.
Third, while foreclosure may have been the stated concern, 65 the man-
ner in which the Commission used the term "foreclosure" is different than
the traditional economic usage. In antitrust, foreclosure results when a firm
shuns competition on the merits and illegally uses monopoly power to re-
strict the ability of competitors to compete with it. 166 The Commission, in
its decision, alleges no illegal acts, or acts that eschew competition on the
merits, but concludes that competition would be harmed because competi-
tors would be foreclosed.167 For example, the Commission stated "[t]he
ability of the merged entity to engage in profitable forms of packaged sales"
would likely lead to "market foreclosure."'1 68 Competitors would be fore-
closed (in the form of lower market share and profits) not because of any il-
legal activity of GE-Honeywell, but because of the Commission's
perception that GE-Honeywell's competitors are inferior. 169 Even if this is
true, the fact that one competitor is superior on the merits to other competi-
tors is hardly a substantial harm that warrants the concern of regulators.
Range effects doctrine resembles antitrust doctrine in the United States
during the 1960s,170 when structure-conduct-performance theory had influ-
ence. 171 Regulators challenged mergers that would create a firm whose size
and scope of activities would create a market structure favorable to poten-
63 CD GE, supra note 45, at 384.
(A Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 134.
165 Roundtable, supra note 115, at 7 (Gonzalez-Diaz).
166 Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 20.
67 Id. (citing 163 of CD GE).
168 CD GE, supra note 45, 398.
'69 d 355.
170 id.
171 See text, supra pp. 19-2 1.
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tial exclusionary unilateral conduct. The European Commission used this
kind of structural market logic to deem GECAS's buying practices as harm-
ful. 172 Antitrust regulators and pundits came to realize that this was "not a
good measure of how competitive an industry is and what constraints there
are on the firm in terms of setting price[s] or providing quality products to
consumers."' 173 The Commission's decision is consistent only with the be-
lief that merger policy is intended to protect competitors from competition,
not competition from competitors. Even if competitors are marginalized
and forced out of business, 74 any attempt to raise profits would induce
competitors into the market. 175 Their cost of being in the market would be
the same as the monopolists. 1
76
B. Processes and Politics
There are other important differences between the U.S. antitrust au-
thorities and the Commission. In the European Union, the Commission has
sole jurisdiction in merger review, 177 which is a significant difference. In
the United States, the FTC, DOJ, and State Attorneys General can move to
block a merger, and the fact that a proposed merger is allowed is no bar to
regulators bringing a suit ex post. The Commission, however, has more
pressure to be correct, because the initial review is the only review. The
Commission cannot revisit a merger after approval is granted, nor can it
clear mergers by utilizing conduct-based remedies (for example, an agree-
ment not to engage in bundling). This may explain why the Commission is
more willing to accept speculative possibilities and weigh long-term effects
more heavily.
78
In the United States, antitrust authorities must bring action in court,
and it is the judiciary that decides cases. This affords an appeals process.
In the European Union, courts have a much smaller role, and there is no
step for interlocutory judicial review of the Commission's decisions. There
is an appeals process, but an appeal will not restore a merger that was
barred.' 9 Commissioner Monti responded to the criticism that the Euro-
pean Union lacks effective judicial control of the Commission's merger de-
172 Goldhaber, supra note 12.
173 Baker, supra note 9.
174 Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 134.
175 See Posner, supra note 56, at 929.
176 See discussion, supra Part III.A.
177 Council Regulation 17/62/EEC, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty, 1962 O.J. (L 13) 204 (as amended), available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/
sgadoc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31962R0017&model=g
uichett.
178 Roundtable, supra note 115, at 14-15 (Gonzalez-Diaz).
179 Goldhaber, supra note 12, at 116.
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cisions by saying that 40% of its prohibition decisions were subject to judi-
cial scrutiny, and 87% of those decisions were upheld.1 80 Yet he noted that
the appeals take a long time, which leads some parties to abandon the cause.
Monti also claims that there is an elaborate system of checks and balances
because the Competition Commissioner only proposes a decision, and the
College of Commissioners decides the final outcome. Also, Commissioner
Monti noted that the E.C.'s system ensures a high level of transparency, be-
cause parties are informed in detail of any objections the Commission might
have, and unlike the DOJ, is required to publicize its decision. 181 This ig-
nores the practical reality of communication between the DOJ or FTC and
merging companies, and the fact that since U.S. authorities can bring suit
against companies even after mergers are approved, courts would produce a
public decision.
Perception-wise, perhaps the difference that causes the most problems
is that the European Commission is seemingly more apt to listen to com-
petitors' concerns. 182 While this is an inevitable result since the Commis-
sion has a monopoly on enforcement, antitrust observers did not fail to
point out the Commission's open ear to competitors. 83 U.S. authorities
may contact firms in a given industry in preliminary investigations, but the
competitors in the European Union are given a formal opportunity to voice
opposition. Commissioner Monti voiced strong opposition to the notion
that complaints from competitors had any impact on the decision, stating
"[t]he test for considering a complaint is not whether it originates from a
customer or a competitor but rather whether it is based on accurate factual
information and well-supported and acceptable economic reasoning.
', 184
Yet if accurate factual information is the goal, why was GE not allowed to
present counter-evidence? In the days leading up to the decision, Commis-
sioner Monti himself noted that the proposed merger had raised strong
enough concerns among United States and European competitors to justify
the Commission's reservations about the deal. 8 5 Whatever the extent of the
competitors' sway, it left a bad taste in the mouth of observers.
180 Monti Speech, supra note 93, at question 2. As noted before, while courts can review
the Commission's decisions, barred mergers cannot be overturned.
181 Id.
182 Perhaps this is because it lacks adequate staff. Goldhaber, supra note 12, at 117; see
also Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 25.
83 Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 125; Steven Andersen, Monti Stalls GE's Bid For Hon-
eywell: Merger Put Under E. U. Antitrust Microscope, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 2001, at
pBWB 9 (col. 1).
Monti Speech, supra note 93, question 1.
E.U. Poised to Block GE Merger Deal (June 20, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/europe/06/20/honeywell.merger/index.html.
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V. TRADE RELATIONS AND CONVERGENCE
While the Commission was reviewing the merger, U.S. Treasury Sec-
retary Paul O'Neill remarked that the European Commission was meddling
"outside its jurisdiction"' 86 and that a rejection would be "off the wall."' 87
President Bush, speaking in Warsaw, expressed his concern that the E.C. re-
jected a merger passed by United States and Canadian authorities. 188
Commissioner Monti lashed out at those critical of the European Commis-
sion's handling of the deal, calling any "political interference" in the case
deplorable, with no place in an antitrust case. 189 This must have been an in-
teresting accusation for the U.S. regulators and politicians who often view
E.U. enforcement decisions as "instruments of European industrial pol-
icy."' 190 An allegation arose that a young E.U. staff wanted to take on the
"Great Jack Welch" and saw an opportunity to introduce their new antitrust
ideas,' 9' which, if true, would "make U.S. companies wary of Europe."'
' 92
Whether the allegations were true or not, it demonstrates the general level
of distrust between the two jurisdictions.
As much as GE and Honeywell seem to be the losers here, a more sig-
nificant loser might be trade relations. If nothing is done to move towards
convergence, the larger relationship may suffer, inviting retaliation.' 93 In-
deed, several U.S. Senators accused the European Commission of
protectionism, and warned of a "chilling effect" on trade relations' 94 and
possible retaliation from Washington.'95 Senator Phil Gramm, ranking
member of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
released a statement expressing his concern that bad policies will be
imposed on the United States as the European Union tries to protect itself
from a loss of competitive edge. There is "less and less such a thing as a
purely American company any more. These are world companies."'
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Therein lies the need for convergence. As companies increasingly op-
erate across borders, divergent standards cause problems in three ways: (1)
uncertainty adds to the cost of doing business by dissipating the rents that
the synergies of any efficient merger would create; (2) antitrust laws will
operate on the lowest common denominator, where the least efficient sys-
tem will create opportunity costs; and, (3) political tensions can incite re-
taliation that decreases societal welfare.
Nearly seventy countries administer some form of merger review.' 
97
Some countries, like South Africa, specifically seek to empower disenfran-
chised groups, while some, like Iceland and Canada, explicitly state effi-
ciency as their goal.198 Currently only the United States and the European
Union exercise veto power due to their economic and political power, but
international markets are dynamic. And, while the European Union may
not yet flex the economic power of the United States, the E.U. version of
competition policy may be more influential worldwide because the E.U.
member states have aligned their laws to match the European Union, and as
more countries seek membership into the European Union, their model may
grow. 199
Policy must be geared towards efficiency.200 Over time, "consumers
gain the most from a policy that emphasizes allocative and productive effi-
ciency. '20'I The European Union could start by recognizing an efficiency
defense for mergers that enhance market power. But policy differences are
not the only "brick in an ever-growing wall of regulation., 20 2 There are
also structural differences as well. The Commission is unwilling to take the
wait-and-see approach available to U.S. regulators because it lacks post-
transaction remedies. Thus, the Commission is more willing to block a
merger with uncertain and speculative outcomes.
203
On a practical level, the Commission is less subject to a check on its
decisions. It wears the hats of investigator, prosecutor, and judge in merger
reviews. 204 Any convergence between United States and European Union
gramm/0620ge.htm.
197 Janet L. McDavid & Lynda K. Marshall, Global Review Regimes, NAT'L L.J., Sep-
tember 24, 2001, at A23 (col. 1).
'98 Waller & Stoner, supra note 75, at 66.
'99 Id. at 67.
200 The more difficult question is one of sovereignty, "Efficiency in what jurisdiction?"
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based model for international antitrust laws, see Daniel J. Gifford & E. Thomas Sullivan,
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antitrust policies must entail both policy and process. A significant step
would be to authorize the Commission to utilize conduct remedies in its
merger review process. This procedural step would likely alleviate some of
the substantive issues concerning E.U. merger policy by allowing the
Commission to rely less on the speculative effects a merger may have.
U.S. antitrust authorities and the European Commission are beginning
to undertake coordinated efforts in antitrust policies. While increased
communication is a start, more will be needed due to the rooted economic
and social differences between the United States and the European Union.
While a wait-and-see approach might in the end be successful (indeed, the
United States just a few decades ago followed the very economic principles
it criticizes today), it could prove too costly in the growing and dynamic na-
ture of today's international market.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Commission based its decision to block the GE-Honeywell merger
on tenuous economic grounds that are at their best indifferent, and at their
worst hostile, to efficiencies that benefit customers. The willingness to ap-
ply the range effects theory shows a skepticism towards the ability of mar-
kets to foster competition in the long term. The Commission's unwarranted
regulatory action in the GE-Honeywell merger discounts the ability of
competitors to create innovation and efficiencies that would match any
short-term advantages a conglomerate merger may create for the merged
company. The very idea of competition is turned on its head.
The failed GE-Honeywell merger "points to the continuing need for
consultation to move toward greater policy convergence. 2 °5 As the world
seeks free trade in a global economy, nations must realize that faulty anti-
trust policy and protectionism, real or perceived, will only hinder effi-
ciency.
205 See GE PR 2, supra note 36.
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